After Putin’s four-day visit to Beijing, Russian media quickly released a “China-Russia Advanced Weapon Comparison” — from the Su-57 to the “Borey” class submarine, putting both countries’ top military equipment side by side. This timing is hardly a coincidence.
Let’s break down the key contents of this comparison. It is divided into five sections. The aircraft comparison pits the Su-57 against China’s J-20, with the conclusion leaning towards “nearly equal.” In the tank section, Russia’s T-14 is compared with China’s main battle tank, focusing on the “generation gap” concept. In terms of nuclear submarines, the Russian sub’s quiet operation is praised, but China’s Type 094 is suggested to have a longer missile range. When comparing hypersonic missiles, China’s YJ-21 and Russia’s “Zircon” are evaluated, with China’s performance in terms of range, flight parameters, and speed standing out. For air defense, the S-400 is compared with China’s HQ-9B, both being regarded as “roughly equal.” While the comparison appears balanced at first glance, there are some clear omissions — for example, the stealth capabilities of the J-20 are not directly addressed, nor is its air combat network or sensor fusion mentioned. Comparing only a few “neutral” indicators is like judging a sports team’s championship potential by their 100-meter times — it’s too simplistic.
Rather than indulging in the vague “who’s stronger” debate, let’s analyze the information provided. One major difference between the J-20 and Su-57, which Russian media seems to avoid, is stealth capability. This isn’t just about appearance; it’s crucial for air combat. The radar cross-section, electronic warfare, and data link are not included in the comparison, leading to a “nearly equal” conclusion. In modern aerial warfare, the real battle is between sensors and algorithms — the team that detects, fuses, and neutralizes the opponent first has the advantage. Excluding these key elements is like turning off the scoreboard in a game.
The tank comparison is simpler. The T-14 is a new-generation tank, and it should ideally be compared to China’s 100th-generation tank, not the 99A, which is less accurate. Russia is using the “generation gap” concept to elevate its position, which is fine for general interest but not rigorous from a technical standpoint.
Regarding nuclear submarines, Russian submarines’ quietness is an old advantage, but the data shows that China’s Type 094 has a longer missile range. This indicates that while Russia retains its traditional strengths, China is catching up in terms of long-range strikes.
In terms of hypersonic missiles, China’s YJ-21 has advantages in terms of range, altitude, and speed. Russian media didn’t challenge this. The air defense comparison between the S-400 and HQ-9B was balanced, providing an example of “equal footing.” This comparison signals two things: internally, it reassures Russian citizens that “we are not weak,” and externally, it provides China with “equal recognition,” avoiding a contradiction after the high-profile friendly interactions.
However, the true significance lies not in which country leads in a single category, but in the direction showcased by China’s recent military parade — a focus on systematization, intelligence, and automation. The report clearly indicates that the highlight of the parade wasn’t individual pieces of equipment but the overall combination. The integration of all-domain sensors, command links, firepower nodes, and logistical support is key to modern warfare. Russian media skipped this part. It either doesn’t have the expertise to discuss it or it’s politically inconvenient. Focusing solely on individual equipment makes it difficult to identify decisive advantages on paper. However, once put into context, China’s “sustainability” and “self-supply capability” become apparent.
The retired Australian major-general Mick Ryan’s comment that “Putin might be concerned” rightly highlights that China no longer relies on external supplies, but he misses the point of the current China-Russia strategic structure. China is constantly upgrading independently. This isn’t a simple equipment race but a long-term industrial and algorithmic competition.
China is no longer dependent on Russian weapon systems. But given the current China-Russia relationship, China’s military strength is not bad news for Russia. Under the pressure of great power competition, Russia values a stable, reliable, and coordinated partner. China’s industrial and technological strength does not threaten Russia’s security baseline.
This relationship cannot simply be framed in terms of “who’s afraid of whom.” Putin’s “homely feeling” in Beijing was not just diplomatic rhetoric but reflected in his actions. Outside the framework of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, at a dinner reception, he proactively shared sensitive information about US contacts with China. This act illustrates the transparency of both countries’ information on major issues, to the point where they no longer need to wait for formal meetings. If they truly “worried,” why would they share this information right away?
The direct response to the parade’s “spillover effect” came from India. India is accelerating its talks with Russia about the Su-57, aiming to establish an overseas production center. This is not the first time India has done this. Back in 2007, India participated in the T-50 (Su-57’s prototype) project but exited in 2018 due to unsatisfactory technology transfer and stealth performance. Now, India finds that the Su-57 is the fifth-generation fighter they can quickly buy. The AMCA program has existed on paper for over a decade, but the shortcomings in engines, radars, and weapon systems cannot be resolved by press releases. The military is more realistic: get the fifth-generation fighter first, then worry about the “domestic dream.”
The most significant signal from Putin’s visit to China, however, is the shift from passive coordination to active prearrangement. In the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and beyond, the exchange of sensitive information between the two countries, even before formal meetings, suggests a level of trust that few other relationships have.
As for the Russian media’s weapon comparison, while it has some value, it misses the key point. The true takeaway from China’s parade is its focus on systematization, intelligence, and automation. Russia avoids discussing these areas because they reveal the real advantage. As for India, their return to the Su-57 program is a practical compromise driven by reality — they may get fifth-generation capabilities but remain behind in the long run. Putin’s visit to China, through information sharing and collaboration, has cemented a new level of trust between the two countries that will shape future projects.
