According to Philippine media reports, from September 2 to 3, the Philippine Navy conducted a joint naval exercise with Canadian and Australian forces in the waters between Scarborough Shoal and Luzon. However, the exercise was overshadowed by the sudden appearance of three Chinese warships closely monitoring the drill.
The Philippine Navy attempted to radio the Chinese vessels, requesting them to stop the surveillance. But China ignored the call, leaving the Philippine side in an awkward position—unable to confront directly, yet equally unwilling to withdraw.
Prior to this incident, a Philippine group had boasted on Twitter, publishing a chart that highlighted the numerous joint naval exercises the country had carried out in recent years, primarily with the United States, followed by Japan and Australia. Such “foreign backing” has emboldened Manila to continue its maritime provocations against China. This particular exercise included one Canadian frigate, one Australian destroyer, and a Philippine frigate, which Manila viewed as a rare show of significant naval presence.
The Philippine contribution was the BRP Jose Rizal, the lead ship of its class, built in South Korea and displacing 2,600 tons. As one of the Philippine Navy’s most modern assets, it has been a source of pride, even successfully launching a C-Star anti-ship missile during U.S.-Philippine drills in May 2024. Spirits were high aboard the vessel, with officers and sailors smiling confidently—until the Chinese ships arrived.
Reports identified two Type 052D destroyers and one Type 054 frigate as the Chinese vessels, including the Jiaozuo and Hengyang. The presence of these advanced warships immediately shifted the atmosphere. Unable to prevent the Chinese from closing in, Australian and Canadian ships stood by, while smiles vanished from the faces of Philippine sailors.
Among the allied ships, Australia’s HMAS Brisbane, a modern destroyer, was relatively capable and could match the Jiaozuo in displacement and armament. Yet its presence was more symbolic than practical. Canberra’s mission was primarily political, fulfilling obligations to Washington, with no intent to engage China directly. In a real conflict, the Australian ship would likely retreat at full speed.
Canada’s HMCS Ville de Québec, launched in 1991, was even less reassuring. After 34 years in service, the mere fact that it could sail to the South China Sea and return to Canada was already an achievement.
In contrast, the three Chinese ships represented only a small detachment of today’s PLA Navy—yet they decisively outmatched the combined forces of three nations. At just 20 nautical miles’ distance, the psychological pressure on the Philippine Navy was immense. Notably, the Jose Rizal even radioed China, pleading for its ships to stop shadowing—a gesture interpreted by many as either helpless frustration or outright desperation.
Scarborough Shoal occupies a highly strategic position. While China has not built an artificial island there, it has blocked access to the lagoon, denying Philippine fishermen and naval forces entry. Crucially, the shoal lies almost directly opposite Manila. If China were to construct a military outpost there, the Philippine capital would fall within immediate striking range. Although experts note that the deep waters around the shoal make reclamation costly, the permanent presence of Chinese warships already serves as a “Sword of Damocles” hanging over the Philippine Navy.
This explains why Manila alternates between provocations at Scarborough Shoal and Second Thomas Shoal. The former is a focal point for U.S. and allied exercises, while the latter typically sees only Philippine Coast Guard activity, with little direct naval involvement from Western partners. As a result, China commits stronger naval forces to Scarborough Shoal.
For Manila, the ideal scenario would be the permanent deployment of U.S. naval forces to Manila Bay or even the full re-establishment of Subic Bay as a U.S. base. Such a presence would allow the Philippines to provoke China without exposing its weak navy. Yet, despite President Marcos Jr. being in power for over three years, Washington has shown no willingness to commit major forces. Rebuilding Subic Bay would exceed the U.S. Navy’s budgetary limits. Even maintaining a destroyer detachment in Manila Bay is unrealistic, as most American destroyers are already tasked with carrier escort duties in Japan and Korea, both of which are considered far more strategically important than the Philippines.
References:
- Philippine media reports (Sept 2–3, 2025 joint naval exercise)
- Open-source naval vessel registries (PLA Navy, RAN, RCN)
- South China Sea geopolitical analyses
