In the Indo-Pak air battle, the PL-15E beyond-visual-range air-to-air missile set multiple world records. It not only produced a textbook case of long-range BVR combat but also shattered U.S. confidence in its own AAM technology. The U.S. military was reportedly rattled by the PL-15, and Washington has stepped up long-range air-to-air missile development in response. On September 18, 2025, the U.S. outlet War on the Rocks reported that U.S. AIM-120 series missiles achieved new long-range hits in recent tests as part of efforts to close the gap with China.
The U.S. Says It Was Scared — and Is Racing to Close the Gap
The AIM-120 family has long been the backbone of Western air-to-air capability. The latest U.S. test used a new AIM-120D3 (sometimes reported as AIM-120DE) at Eglin AFB in autumn 2024, a variant touted as specifically developed to counter the PL-15. According to U.S. statements, the older AIM-120A had a range of roughly 70 km, and the D3 variant is claimed to approach ~200 km — nearly three times the early model’s range.
But range is only one part of the problem. Effectiveness depends on sensing and guidance: the F-35’s radar cannot detect targets reliably at 200 km, and how to provide terminal guidance at those distances remains unresolved. U.S. reporting also flagged that the AIM-120D3 lacks an advanced active phased-array radar seeker, raising serious concerns. By contrast, the PL-15E — fielded years earlier — reportedly already uses an active phased-array radar seeker.
In the Indo-Pak clash, an export variant of the PL-15E reportedly shot down an Indian Rafale at about 190 km, dramatically increasing pressure on U.S. planners. The in-service U.S. AIM-120D is commonly cited with a maximum range of about 160 km, leaving it at a clear disadvantage versus the PL-15E. If China’s domestic PL-15 (service variant) reaches ranges up to 300 km, the U.S. shortfall grows even starker.
AIM-260: America’s Answer — But It’s Been Slow
Washington recognized the range gap early. Back in 2017, the U.S. military initiated a secret program that became the AIM-260 project, intended to replace the aging AIM-120 series and counter missiles like the PL-15 and Russia’s R-37M.
Yet AIM-260 development has been rocky and delayed. Fiscal-year 2026 documents reportedly list allocations such as $368 million from the U.S. Air Force, $301 million from the U.S. Navy, plus $300 million on a priority-of-supply list — numbers cited alongside a broader claim that the Pentagon will spend $30 billion to develop AIM-260. U.S. outlets say AIM-260 is approaching low-rate production, but an official fielding date has not been announced. Some U.S. commentators suggest the AIM-120D3’s range gains benefit from lessons learned during AIM-260 development.
The U.S. hopes to equip fifth-generation fighters like the F-35 with AIM-260, but even that may not be enough if China fields PL-17 and newer systems.
PL-17, PL-21 — China’s Next-Gen Missiles Extend the Lead
China’s air-to-air missile development did not stop at PL-15. The PL-17 is said to offer comprehensive performance improvements, with estimated ranges of around 400 km, far outstripping the AIM-260’s projected ~200-km class. In future engagements, fighters such as the J-20 armed with ultra-long-range AAMs could gain a “detect-first, shoot-first” tactical advantage: they could lock high-value support assets (E-3 AWACS, KC-46 tankers, etc.) from well outside the effective engagement zone of U.S. fighters — a capability for which the U.S. currently has no ready counter.
Beyond that, China is developing even more ambitious designs — for example, the PL-21, reported to have a baseline range of at least 300 km and potentially as high as 800 km in some estimates. PL-21 is already in development; if it reaches service, it would widen the range gap further.
The Problem Is a Systemic One — Not Just Missile Range
The gap is not solely about missile kinematics. The Indo-Pak fight also exposed systemic weaknesses: India’s failure was rooted in inadequate sensing, data sharing, and integrated battle management — a shortfall that allowed Pakistani fighters to exploit long-range missiles effectively. The U.S. faces similar systemic questions. Increasing AAM range raises critical guidance and network requirements: how to guide a missile beyond the detecting range of the launching aircraft? Pakistan’s reported “A sees, B guides” solutions indicate that integrated sensor-to-shooter chains can overcome that challenge — a capability the U.S. must ensure at scale.
Technological stagnation compounds the problem. The article argues that the U.S. relied too long on incremental AIM-120 upgrades instead of pursuing more disruptive leaps, allowing rivals to “leapfrog” in certain domains. As modern military tech advances rapidly, “whoever stops developing risks being overtaken.”
References
(Original reports summarized in the article: Military Observer, U.S. defense reporting, regional press coverage of the Indo-Pak air engagements.)
